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DECLARATIONS OF SPOUSE AGAINST SPOUSE
The principle is almost universal, that the declarations
of one person made out of court, not under oath or affirmation, not in the presence and subject to the crossexamination of another, cannot be employed against anThe common law, while often saying that husother.
band and wife were one, never punished one for the offence of the other; never except in cases of feigned, presumed or express agency, fastened on one, liabilities
springing out of a contract made by the other; never regarded admissions or affirmations by one of the conduct
of the other, as evidences of such conduct, on the theory
that they were one, and that an admission by one of the acts
of the other, was virtually an admission by the other.
To the hearsay principle, certain exceptions have
been recognized. Dying declarations, statements against
interest of persons since dead, written statements in books
The intiof original entries, etc., are some of them.
macy of husband and wife, giving each knowledge of
the acts of the other; the interest each has in the other,
inducing each to make no untrue statements that would
compromise the other, have never been considerations
deemed sufficient to create an exception to the policy
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which does not allow one person to be injuriously affected by ex parte declarations of another.
Statement By One Spouse Made In Presence of the Other
When A makes a statement in the hearing of another,
which tends to impute to him a criminal or a civil liability, and the other remains silent when he could, and, if
able to contradict, would probably speak in denial or qualification of the statement, the statement may be put in
evidence, in conjunction with proof of the silence of the
person affected by it. Not the statement, but the more
or less distinct recognition by the person affected of its
truth, is deemed the evidence.
Statements by husband
and wife, about the wife or husband, in the hearing of the
other spouse, not denied or explained, when, if untrue,
such denial or explanation would be probable, are no exception.
A recent illustration is found in Casciola v.
Donabelli,1 ejectment by Maria D. Casciola, against her
grantee, in a deed, in the execution of which her husband
had not joined. If the land had been hers, the deed was
void. If she had held the land, under a resulting trust
for her husband, his joinder was unnecessary; the deed
was valid. Proof was given in behalf of the defendant,
that when he bargained for the purchase of the property,
he did so with the plaintiff's husband in her presence, and
that the husband said "The house is in my wife's name,
but it belongs to me. I made some kind of a fake deal,
and gave it to my wife, but really the house is mine."
She made no reply to this. Another witness was called
to testify to statements of the plaintiff's husband. Overruling the objection to his testimony, Scott, J., said: "This
testimony is received, for the purpose of tending to show,
1218 Pa. 624. In Peck v. Ward, 18 Pa. 506, declarations by a
wife, made in the presence of the husband, and to which he made no
reply, were rejected; possibly because, if admitted, they could not divest the title of the wife to land, which had been uncontestedly hers.
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by declarations of Filippo Casciola, in the presence of
his wife, made without objection from him, or declarations
of the wife herself, at the time to which the witness refers, that she was holding the title in her name as trustee
for her husband." Brown, J., remarks "All of these conversations took place before the Donatelli's purchased the
property, and having been against the interest of the wife,
were admissible to rebut the presumption of a gift to her,
and to establish the contention of the appellees that she
held the title .intrust for her children."
DeclarationsAssimilated to Testimony
The principle that a spouse cannot testify against a
spouse is regarded as forbidding the use of declarations of
Declarations of a husband,
one spouse against another.
said Green, J., could not be received on the ground of his
being the wife's agent, because they were not a part of the
res gestae. "But they were fatally incompetent for the
entirely independent reason that they were the declarations
of a husband offered against his wife. It is enough to
know that the law does not permit the direct testimony of
the husband against his wife, and as a matter of course,
in the form of decit cannot permit his indirect testimony
'2
larations adverse to her interest."
Presence Necessary
The cases which decide that the statements of one
spouse are not admissible against the other, mention the
circumstance that they are not made in the presence of the
other. Thus, Burnside, J., observes, "The declarations of
the wife, made in the absence of the husband, and affecting
the interests of the husband, are not evidence. The policy
of the law excludes the husband and wife from testifying,
2Martin v. Rutt, 127 Pa. 380; Burrell Township v. Uncapher, 117
Pa. 353; Thomas v. Butler, 24 Super. 305; Peck v. Ward, 18 Pa. 506;
Evans v. Evans, 155 Pa. 572; Jones v. McKee, 3 Pa. 496.
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where the rights of either are concerned. * * * The court
were right in excluding the declarations of the wife, in the
absence of the husband."'3 Presence when a statement is
made, is a means of knowledge of the making of it. Rogers, J., remarks, "undoubtedly the acts and declarations of
a wife without knowledge and consent of the husband, do
not affect his title.4 Strong, J., negates the admissibleness of declarations of a husband, that land, in his wife's
name, was his, by observing that "they were made in
their (the wife's grantee's) absence and not in the presence of any one under whom they claim."' The register
having granted letters of administration on A's estate to a
woman who claimed to be his widow, on appeal she testified
to the fact of an agreement between deceased and her to
become husband and wife. The facts of cohabitation, reputation, birth of issue,, the decedent's unqualified recognition of the woman as his wife, were proved. The only
evidence opposed consisted of declarations of the deceased
denying the marriage "As these declarations", says Ashman, J., "were made in the respondent's absence, they were
clearly inadmissible."6
If a witness testifies to declarations of the husband, injurious to the wife's claim and on
cross-examination says that the wife was not present, the
court will, on application by the wife's counsel, strike out
the evidence. 7
Silence As An Estoppel
The theory of the courts is that silence when a statement which impugns or denies the hearer's right is made
in his hearing, is in the absence of explanation. of the sisJones v. McKee, 3 Pa. 496.
4Murphy v. Hubert, 16 Pa. 50; Ejectment.
5Thomas v. Maddon, 50 Pa.'261: Cf. Lee v. Newell, 107 Pa. 283;
Leedom v. Leedom, 160 Pa. 273; Commonwealth v. Stump, 53 Pa.
132; Parry v. Parry, 130 Pa. 94.
OMoore's Estate, 9 C. C. 338.
7
Evans v. Evans, 155 Pa. 572.
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lence consistently with non-assent to the truth of the declaration, an admission of its truth. An admission may, however, be contradicted. It may be proven to be mistaken,
or otherwise untrue. If important action will probably
be taken by the person who hears the declaration and is
witness of the apparent acquiescence in its truth, the failure to contradict it may work an estoppel against subsequently denying the truth of the declaration; so far as the
person who has acted in reliance on it is concerned. When
the person making the declaration is a husband, and, in her
hearing he denies her right, her silence is, at least in some
cases, not an estoppel in favor of one who parts with rights,
assumes obligations, in reliance on the declaration. Feigned issue to determine to which of two creditors, a fund
raised by an execution sale should be paid. Anna Kunz
had transferred goods in a store to her husband, P. Kunz,
and he had confessed a judgment for their value. Subsequently to the transfer of the goods, Paul asked about the
transfer in the presence of Mrs. Kunz and P. Kunz said
that the business had been his, and that he owed nobody.
The wife did not reveal the fact that he was indebted to
her. 'More than a year after this occurrence, Paul sold
goods to Kunz. He attached the goods under the Act of
1869.
The goods being sold on Mrs. Kunz's fi. fa., a
feigned issue was formed to decide whether Mrs. Kunz,
Green, J., holds
or Paul was entitled to the proceeds.
that she was not estopped from taking the fund. If she
had said that she had no claim against her husband, she
would have been bound to one who acted in reliance on
her word. But, a general declaration of the husband that
he owed nobody, did not impose on her a duty to disclose
her claim to a stranger, especially as he was not, at that
time, purposing to become a creditor, or making inquiry
with reference to an immediate sale of goods. It can hardly be considered that a wife would be subject to a legal
duty to contradict her husband, and practically declare him
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a falsifier, her own claim of indebtedness not being called
The husin question. (But it was called in question.
band, claiming the goods recently transferred by the wife
In Thomas v.
to him, said that he "owed nobody."8 )
Butler,9 a husband had, in the presence of his wife, asserted that certain personal property was her's, to B. who a
year and a half subsequently, extended credit to the husband, because he believed him to own the goods. The wife
The court properly told the jury
had remained silent.
what was equivalent to saying that her mere silence would
not estop her.
Silence Not Necessarily Consent
The fact that the silence of a person, when in his presence, a declaration is made, thetruth of which would derogate from his interest, may be explained otherwise than
by assuming the consciousness of this person that the declaration is true does not ordinarily prevent the use of the
silence as evidential. The jury must derive the motive for
it. Yet it was supposed by Kennedy, J., to be a justification for excluding evidence of the silence altogether, in
Wilt v. Vickers. 0 A father sued for injuries to his boy.
The wife's statement, in the boy's presence, of what he had
said concerning his suffering was excluded, and the exclusion was justified on two grounds: (1) The father ought
not to be affected by the declaration of the boy, unless they
tended to contradict the boy's testimony for his father;
(2) "Besides it can easily be believed that either a boy's
respect for, or dread of incurring the displeasure of his
mother, would be sufficient to prevent him from contradicting her though she should be tating certain things in
regard to him that were not so." If a boy might let pass
uncontradicted, a statement of his mother -concerning his
8Paul v. Kunz, 188 Pa. 504.
924 Super. 305.
108 W. 227.
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own acts or words which he knew to be untrue, a wife
might do the same in regard to statements in her presence
made by the husband. This possibly is not sufficient to
require the exclusion of evidence of the silence.
Acts Other Than Declarations
The husband or wife may do acts indicative of an ignoring or denial of the alleged rights of wife or husband.
The husband, e. g. may have a tract of land assessed for
taxation to himself; he may control it as if it were his
own.". A wife may send a telegram to her husband in a
suit against whom, the plaintiff attempts to use it. 12 For
acts of husband or wife, the wife or husband should not
be responsible unless she actively participates therein. .
Either Spouse Incompetent to Affect the Other
The inability of one spouse to affect, by his or her declaration the interests of the other, does not depend on sex.
The husband is unable thus to prejudice his wife's interests.14 She is also unable to prejudice his. 5
Effect of Death of Declarant
Declarations by husband or wife, tending to affect the
wife's husband's interests, inadmissible when made, are not
rendered admissible by his or her subsequent death, before
the trial at which an effort is made to employ them.""
"Light v. Zeller, 144 Pa. 582.
12Benford v. Sanner, 40 Pa. 9.
"144 Pa. 582; Benford v. Sanner, 40 Pa. 9.
' 4Smith v. Scudder, 111 S. & R. 325; Thomas v. Maddan, 50 Pa.
261; Parry v. Parry, 130 Pa. 94; Gicker's Adm. v. Martin, 50 Pa. 138;
Leedom v. Leedom, 160 Pa. 273.
"5Murphy v. Hubert, 16 Pa. 50; Thomas v. Maddan, 50 Pa. 261;
Lee v. Newell, 107 Pa. 283; Benford v. Sanner, 40 Pa. 9; Wit v. Vickers, 8 W. 227; Moody v. Fulmer, 3 Gr. 17.
"6Parry v. Parry, 130 Pa. 94; Thomas v. Maddan, 50 Pa. 261;
Harmany v. Life Association, 151 Pa. 17; Commonwealth v. Stump, 53
Pa. 132; Smith v. Scudder, 11 S. & R. 325.
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When DeclarantHas Been a Witness
If,in a suit by or against a wife or husband, the husband or wife has been a witness for him or her, incohsistent declarations madebythewitness whether in the presence
or the absence of the husband or wife concerning whom
they were, are receivable in evidence, for the purpose of
lessening the credit to be attached to his or her present testimony. In ejectment against a husband, alone, claiming
the land as his wife's, the plaintiff asserted that the land
had been his, and, as such had been sold on execution to the
plaintiff. The defendant testified that his wife's money
had been paid for the land, the title to which had been iin
his name until 1891, when, recognizing the trust for his
wife, he conveyed the land to her. The trial court improperly rejected questions on cross-examination of the husband, tending to show that he had endeavored to borrow
money, by asserting that the land was his .own; and also
evidence that he had had the land assessed to himself. Says
McCollum, J., "It seems that the offers were over-ruled on
the ground that they did not propose to show his acts and
declarations in the presence of the wife. But it is obvious
that the purpose of the offer was to discredit him as a witness by showing that his previous actions and statements
were antagonistic to his testimony."
Cross-examination
of the husband should have been allowed, as should proof
by other witnesses that he had made inconsistent statements. 17 A wife claimed for board, against X. Her husband testified for her.
It was competent to ask him
whether he had not said that X was not to pay any board-' s
The husband having, in a sheriff's interpleader, testified in support of his wife's claim of property levied on as
his, by a judgment creditor, "it was clearly competent,"
says Rice, P. J., "to impeach in any legitimate mode, the
17Miller v. Baker, 160 Pa. 172.

2sKinert v. Kapp, 50 Super. 222.
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credibility of the witness by whose testimony she sought to
prove her title. One of the most common modes of impeaching the credit of a witness is by the introduction of
proof that he has made statements out of court, as to matters relevant to the issue, contrary to what he has testified
at the trial."1 9
Agency of Wife For Husband
The wife may be expressly or impliedly instituted agent
for the husband, so as to make statements by her admissible
against him. In A's suit against B, for wages for his own
and his wife's services, the defendant offered to show that
she had said that she was working for her board (which
she had received). Chambers, J., observes, when the husband permits his wife to be employed in the business of life
with others, he necessarily commits to her the agency and
control of her actions and contracts. 17 If she is made able
to contract "she may certainly furnish evidence, while engaged in the business, of the terms of the contract in which
she is employed, as part of the res gestae. The husband
who permits his wife to be engaged in the domestic service
of other families by hiring, which is, it is believed, a common occurrence, cannot with propriety object to the terms
which she made, or on which she was retained, and the services rendered. She was allowed to obtain the situation,
and it must be held on the terms which she made, and of
which her declarations at the time, and whilst engaged in
the work, are evidence."
He concludes that the "declarations of Mrs. Flory, made at the time and place of her service, as to what her employment was, and the terms of it,
were part of the res gestae and in a transaction in which
she was presumed to be acting with the consent of her hus' 9 Thomas v. Butler, 16 Super. 268. In a second trial, the husband was not called as a witness, and his declarations against his

wife's title were therefore not admissible; Thomas v. Butler, 24
Super. 305.
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band, and as such her declarations ought to have been received.2 0 The declarations of a married woman, when acting as the husband's agent, are, said Huston, J., evidence
2
against him.

1

Const'ructive Agency
In an action for the possession of land, the defendant's
right to retain it depended on his having tendered a sum of
money to the plaintiff. He proved that he had called at the
plaintiff's house, had been informed of his absence by his
wife, who, says Gibson, C. J., "by universal custom is the
representative of her husband, so far as to answer the calls
of those who have transactions with him, and to convey to
him the nature of their business, or inform them where he
may be found." Here, the plaintiff's wife told the defendant that .the plaintiff had been absent from home several
days.
Defendant stated his object to be to pay certain
moneys due to her husband, as the price of the land. In
reply, she neither proposed to inform him, nor, as she would
naturally have done had her answer not been prepared, directed the defendant where to find him, but remarked that
it was not worth the defendant's while to offer money, as
it would not be accepted, because they intended to keep the
land.
This declaration was a substantive part of the
transaction from which the jury might draw their own conclusion.
The fact that a declaration which precluded
further inquiry was made by one whose office it would
otherwise have been to furnish the means of access to her
20
Hackman v. Flory, 16 Pa. 196. In a claim by a wife for boarding statements of the husband, in her absence, and contradictory of
her claim, were offered. Says Morrison, J., "if the witness was acting as agent of his wife, the plaintiff, it does not necessarily follow
that the questions quoted in the assignment (as to the husband's declarations) were improper, because they called for a conversation not
in the presence of the plaintiff." Kinert v. Kapp, 50 Super. 222.

2

Dietrich v. Dietrich, 1 P. & W. 306.
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husband, is full of information in respect to the motive of
22
his absence."
Statements Made in Procuring Property
Interpleader, between a vendor of personal property,
(suits of clothes) and the wife of the vendee, who, on a
judgment against her husband, has levied on goods in execution. The vendor alleges that the title to the clothes has
not passed to the vendee, because of fraudulent representations by which he induced the sale. "To exclude proof of
the representations made at the time the goods were secured," says Orlady, J., "would open wide the door to successful fraud, and places in the hands of the fraudulently disposed, the power of securing property through conspiracy
with his wife, and at the same time prevent any investigation of the fraud. This is not the law, and is contrary to
its policy." The report does not make clear that the declarations proved were made when the husband was making the
purchase. The objection of defendant w~s "to any conversation with L. P. Loy (the husband, vendee) or any declarations he may have made to the witness (who this was, does
not appear) in the absence of .his wife, she being a party
to this suit." 23
Conspiracy Between Husband and Wife
The general principle is that acts or declarations of a
grantor after the conveyance, cannot be proved to affect the
title of the grantee. An exception to this principle exists,
when creditors assail the transaction on the ground of
fraud, and some testimony is introduced tending to show
0

2Schoneman v. Weill, 3 Super. 119.
Steele v. Thompson, 3 P. & W. 34. In Martin v. Rutt, 127 Pa.
380, Green, J., says that declarations of the husband could not be received to affect the wife. A9 declarations of an agent, they were
not part of the res gestae. In Fleming v. Parry, 24 Pa. 47, declarations of a wife were excluded because she was not the agent of her
husband.
23
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collusion between grantor and grantee. Then, such subsequent declarations of the grantor are admissible. In an
ejectment between a purchaser at an execution sale of A's
land, and his wife, who proved a conveyance from him before the entry of the judg~ment, and 8 years before the
sheriff's sale, declarations of the husband made some
years after the conveyance to the wife that he had made
the deed in view of entering into the lumbering business,
etc., were properly received. Sterrett, J., says "While the
evidence of collusion in this case was very slight, there were
some facts and circumstances connected with the transaction that were proper for the consideration of the jury, and
justified the court in receiving the testimony."24 There is
a tacit admission that declarations of the husband who had
two years before, conveyed the house to his wife, might
have been admitted, in an ejectment between her heirs and
a purchaser at a sheriff's sale of the house as the husband's, if husband and wife had confederated to defraud
his creditors. Of this Strong, J., saw no evidence. 25 In
a feigned issue to try the validity of a judgment confessed
by a husband to a trustee for his wife, declarations of the
husband relating to his indebtedness to his wife were received by the trial court. Woodward, C. J., was unable to
see how these declarations could have been thought relevant
"to this issue This was not an action of conspiracy against
the husband and wife but it was a feigned issue in process
of distribution of moneys to try the validity of a judgment
which the wife held against the husband and to this issue
he was not a party. On whatprinciplethen could his declarations be evidence against his wife," a series of observations
sufficiently inept.2 6
That a conspiracy between husband
24
Souder v. Schechterly, 91 Pa. 83. Rice, P. J., calls attention in
24 Super. 305, to the fact that the death of the husband had occurred
prior to the trial.
25
Thomas v. Maddan, 50 Pa. 261.
26
- Gicker's Admin. v. Martin, 50 Pa. 138.
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and wife, to claim as her's certain personalty, tobacco, cigars, a horse, an organ, bar room furniture, bought by him,
but, as they alleged as her agent, would not warrant the
reception of the husband's declarations in an issue under
the sheriff's interpleader act, is said by Green, J. The declarations are used testimonially and as the husband cannot
testify against the wife, neither can his declarations be received against her. "Neither the theory of a conspiracy
nor the fact that the husband was the defendant in the execution under which the goods were sold, helps the question
in the least degree. It is still testimony of the husband
'
against the wife and is interdicted. 127
Self-Disserving Declarations
Declarations of a husband or wife derogating from his
or her own right, and favorable to the other spouse, may be
received, in contests involving the respective rights of the
spouses. Thus, in an action between the administrator of the
husband against the next of kin of the wife, concerning personal property which had been hers, the administrator alleged that the husband had outlived the wife, and thus become owner of the goods. The defendant alleged an antenuptial agreement that the property of the wife should
continue hers. Declarations by the husband both before
and after the marriage, that he would have nothing to do
with her property, were properly admitted.1
DeclarationsAs To Marriage
In appeal from the Register's Court, as to the liability
of an estate to pay collateral inheritance tax, the question
was whether A was married to B before the birth of children to them. They were married subsequently, if not before. Evidence offered by the Commonwealth that A, then
27Martin v. Rutt, 127 Pa. 380. The declarations were made out of
the presence of the wife.Thomas v. Butler, 24 Super. 305 follows this
case.
1
Gackenbach v. Brouse, 4 W. & S. 546.
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dead, had declared out of the presence of his wife, that he
had not been married until after the birth of the children,
was rejected. How King, P. J., thought it objectionable,
is not apparent. Apparently the only effect of it would have
been to sustain the collateral inheritance tax, as against
the children. 2 In a controversy, as to whether B, who survived A, was entitled, as his widow, to letters of administration, declarations of A, in his lifetime, denying marriage
3
with B, were held inadmissible.
Father's Suit For Injuries To Son
A having hired his son, 9 or 10 years old to B, B caused him to ride an unruly horse. The boy was thrown off,
and his leg broken. In the father's action against B for
damages, it was proper to refuse to allow proof of what
A's wife, in the presence of the son, who did not contradict
her, said that the son had said to her, about the removal of
the boy from B's house to A's having hurt him, and of her
statement that the boy screamed so that she could not stay
in the house. The boy's declarations could not be proved,
unless they contradicted his testimony as a witness. Besides, suggests Kennedy, J., the boy's failure to contradict
his mother, may have resulted from his "respect" for her,
or his dread of incurring her displeasure. 4
Issues Concerning Wills
In an issue deviisavit vel non, between A, the principal devisee as plaintiff, and B and C, heirs, the court rejected the testimony of X, a witness, that the wife of C,
had attempted to bribe her to swear that the testator was
out of his senses. Huston, J., assumes that the efforts
had not been made in the presence of the husband. "The
declarations of a married woman in the presence of her
2Commonwealth v. Stump, 53 Pa. 132.
3

Moore's Estate, 9 C. C. 338.
4Wilt v. Vickers, 8 W. 227.
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husband," he observes, "or when acting as his agent, are
evidence against him, but, generally, they are not."5
Issue To Try Validity of a Judgment
Judgment in favor of A, as trustee for B's wife,
against B. B's land has been sold in execution, and the
question is, is this judgment entitled to take any of the
proceeds, as against other lien creditors. It was error
to admit against the trustee A testimony concerning declarations of B, relating to his indebtedness to his wife.
Woodward, C. J., asks, on what principle could they be
evidence against the wife? This was not an action of conspiracy. The incapacity of the husband to testify against
the wife, is no reason for, but rather a reason against,
receiving this declaration.6
Creditor of Decedent Claiming in Orphans' Court
In a distribution of the estate of a dead man, in the
Orphans' Court, proof must be made of an alleged loan to
him by the claimant. Admissions of the wife of deceased in the absence of the husband whether made in his
lifetime, or while she was administratrix, after his death,
7
are not evidence to prove the loan.
Sheriff's Interpleader
Under an execution against A, a horse, buggy, etc.,
are levied on. A's wife claims that they belong to her.
In a feigned issue wherein she is plaintiff, and the execution creditor is defendant, a witness for defendant was
asked "State whether or not either of them, James Evans
(the debtor) or his wife told you since this execution was
issued, that this was James Evans' horse, and since this
5

Dietrich v. Dietrich, 1 P. & W. 306.
Gicker's Adm. v. Martin, 50 Pa. 138.
7Liggett's Estate, 12 Dist. 324. Hanna, J., observes that the admission was not made to the claimant or her agent.
6
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alleged sale of the horse to B. C." The evidence was excluded, because "any declarations made by the husband
against his wife's interests were for that reason inadmissible," and the question called indiscriminately for declarations of the husband or of the wife." In a similar
case declarations of the husband not in the presence of
his wife that he had made the bill of sale of the goods
levied on to his wiie, to keep creditors from selling him
out, were properly excluded.,
'Action of Debt
An action of debt was brough' by the obligee in six
sealed notes, to the use of his wife, against the obligor.
The use plaintiff alleged a gift of the notes by the husband, and knowledge thereof by the obligor, prior to any
payments made, or any counter-claims which he might
desire to defalk. While admissions or declarations favorable to the obligor made by the obligee prior to his transfer of his claim to his wife would be admissible, admissions or declarations made after the transfer and after
knowledge thereof came to the obligor, and in the absence
of the wife, would not bd.10 It is not very evident how
the admissibleness of the declarations should depend on
their having been made before the obligor's knowledge of
the transfer. In Fleming v. Parry,1 1 an action of debt
was brought by the administrator of the obligee on a bond
made in 1836. A mortgage had accompanied this bond,
but in 1852 the obligee on the margin of the record of the
mortgage wrote that he "hereby acknowledged to have received satisfaction in full of this mortgage." The defendant contended that this was also intended to be a gift of
the bond. The obligee was father-in-law to the obligor.
sEvans v. Evans, 155 Pa. 572.
oMartin v. Rutt, 127 Pa. 380; Thomas v. Butler, 24 Super. 305.
1
OLee v. Newell, 107 Pa. 283.
1124 Pa. 47.
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Declaration of the wife of the defendant (daughter of the
deceased obligee) tending to show that her father had. not
intended to remit the debt,wer e properly rejected, the
trial court's reason for rejecting being that she was not
authorized to act as agent for her husband.
Resulting Trust in Land
The legal title to land is in A. His wife claims that as
to a fraction, seventy-three eighty-fifths, there is a resulting trust in her favor. The land is levied on and sold, as
It appears at the trial of the ejectment by A and
A's.
wife against the purchaser, thlat A has done acts and made
declarations, ignoring his wife's ownership; permitting it to
be assessed for taxation as his own, etc. They, says Sterrett, J., "were susceptible of explanation. Moreover, they
were acts of the husband alone, for which the wife should
not be held responsible, unless she actively participated
He
therein. ' 12 Land had belonged to Filippo Casciola.
conveyed it to X, who at once conveyed it to his wife Maria
She, her husband not joining, conveyed it to
Casciola.
Donatelli. Five years subsequently, she brings this ejectment against Donatelli, alleging that her conveyance was
void. Defendant alleged that the land, though the legal title to it had been in Maria, was held subject to a resulting
trust for her husband. Declarations of Filippo Casciola,
that she was holding the land in trust for him, made in her
presence, and without objection by her, were admissible to
prove the trust.1 3
Trust Fastened on a Devise
Land was devised by testatrix to her daughter. A son
alleged that it was orally agreed by the daughter with the
testatrix that he was to have an undivided half. In an
ejectment by-him against his sister and her husband to re12Light v. Zeller, 144 Pa. 582.
13Casciola v. Donatelli, 218 Pa. 624.
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cover this half, the trial court correctly excluded evidence
of declarations of the devisee, not made in the presence of
her husband, that she held the land in trust as to half, for
her brother. Burnside, J., observes, the admission of the
wife will bind the husband, only where she has (his) authority to make them. Nor can her declarations affect him
where he sues with her in her right (or is sued with her, in
her right). The declarations of the wife, made in the absence of the husband, and affecting the interests of the husband, are not evidence. The policy of the law excludes
the husband and wife from testifying, where the rights of
either are concerned."' 14 Land belonging at one time to L.
Murphy, was conveyed by him to Delia Chase who, when
wife bf Butler, with him conveyed a moiety of it to Hubert.
In an ejectment by Butler and wife and Hubert, against
Murphy, the latter contended that his conveyance to Delia
Chase was in trust for himself for life, and afterwards, for
The plaintiff alleged, that if so, it was in
his children.
fraud of creditors and the trust was not enforceable. The
trial court properly told the jury that any acts or declarations of Delia Chase after her marriage with Curtis Butler, done or made by her without his knowledge and consent, do not affect the title of Curtis to the premises, nor
that of his partner (cotenant) Lyttleton Hubert." 15
Vendee's Ejectment Against Grantees From Vendor
Ten years after A had contracted to buy land, having
paid some of the purchase money, he left the state. His
family continued to reside on the land. The wife, assisted by some of the sons, made payments on account of the
purchase money and the land was conveyed to her. A dying,
some of his heirs brought ejectment against the devisees
of the wife. One question in dispute was whether A's wife
received the conveyance with his consent. 'The plaintiff
"4Jones v. McKee, 3 Pa. 496.
"sMurphy v. Hubert, 16 Pa. 50.
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offered to prove statements by his father, as to the manner
in which his wife had obtained the conveyance. The court
properly rejected the evidence. Mitchell, J., remarks, "As
the issue was whether the title was in him or his wife, it is
clear that his declarations in his own interest, not made in
his wife's presence are not admissible against the title of
her devisee."'
Curtesy
A husband claiming curtesy against the will of his
wife, retained the possession of her land, against her devisee.
In the ejectment which was brought by the devisee, the effort was to show that he had deserted his wife
more than a year prior to her death and so forfeited his
curtesy. The trial court properly excluded proof offered
by the devisee of declarations of the deceased wife tending
to destroy the right to curtesy, and made in the absence of
7
the husband, defendant.1
Administrator's Sale of Land-Title
Administrators with the will annexed, having given no
bond as such, entered on the duties of the office, and made
sale of the testator's land. Some of the heirs, intending to
contest the validity of this sale, brought ejectment against
The
the purchasers, who had paid the purchase money.
purchase money had been used in the support of the minor
children of the deceased. One of these heirs, Lucy Hood,
with her husband, was among the plaintiffs. The trial court
allowed the defendants to prove that Lucy Hood had said
that she disapproved of the suit. Tilghman, C. J., disapproving, said the evidence was not legal. "As the law protects the husband from his wife's testimony in court, so
16Parry v. Parry, 130 Pa. 94.
'7Munson v. Crookston, 219 Pa. 419.
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does it likewise from her declarations or confessions out
of court. 8
Conspiracy to Misappropriatea Security For Money
An agreement was made by A to transfer to B
In violation of the agreecertain postoffice warrants.
ment, certain of these warrants were not transferred. B
sues A, and two others, on the case for conspiracy to deThe
fraud him out of the proceeds of these warrants.
offered
of
conspiracy
the
allegations
plaintiff to support
in evidence a telegram sent by A's wife to him, in Philadelphia, advising him that the plaintiff, B, and another had
started for Washington, and advising him, A, if he had
trouble, to telegraph to her brother. It was error in the
trial court to receive evidence of the sending of this telegram. "It was neither written nor sent "says Strong, J.,
"by either of the defendants and the declaration of the wife
could not affect even her husband."' 1
Assurnpsit for Money Loaned.
A wife brought assumpsit for $800, alleged by her to
have been received by the defendant under a promise to return it. The defendant offered declarations of the plaintiff's husband made in her absence, tending to show that
the money received by him did not belong to the plaintiff,
and was not received under any obligation to pay it to her.
20
The trial court properly rejected the evidence.
lsMoody's Lessee v. Fulmer, 3 Gr. 17. The Chief Justice adds,
"She can have no will of her own; she can exercise no right over her
own property without his consent. Her deed, under hand and seal,
would be no evidence-much less then should her verbal declarations
be. Her husband had a right to make use of her name, as a plaintiff in this action; and her approbation or disapprobation was a matter not proper to be given in evidence."
19Benford v. Sanner, 40 Pa. 9.
2
OLeedom v. Leedom, 160 Pa. 273.
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Trespass on Land.
A and B have as sole heirs inherited land from their
father. A has became the wife of Peck and B the wife of
Ward. In an action of trespass q. c. f. by Peck and wife,
against three defendants who claimed to have had a
right, under a tenant in common with A, to enter on the land
and do the acts alleged to be trespass, the plaintiffs attempted to prove that Mrs. Ward had said that the land
was not hers but Mrs Peck's; that Mrs. Peck was entitled
to the land because she had kept her father and mother and
buried them. Mr. Ward was present and made no reply.
These declarations were, some of them, in letters, some
verbal. A deed was also offered from Mrs. Ward (her
husband not joining), to Mrs. Peck. The evidence was
properly rejected. Black, C. J., observes that a married
woman's deed, not joined in by the husband, is void. The
declaration of a wife can never be given in evidence to affect the husband's rights of property. The law forbids
either spouse to testify against the other. The same, as
well as other stronger reasons, forbid her declarations to
be proved in a case like this. The husband had an 2estate
in his wife's lands, a tenancy by the curtesy initiate. 1
Ejectmen to Nullify a Partition.
Land described to seven children. A partition was
had in the Orphans' Court, and the land was allotted to
Smith, in right of his wife, one of the heirs, he giving a
mortgage to secure judgment of a sum of money. He
never gave the mortgage, and died, the land descending to
his daughtr, Mrs. Scudder. The plaintiff, treating the
partition as null, brings ejectment for one ceventh of the
lands. The defendant alleges that while the mortgage was
not given, the whole of the money payable to the plaintiff,
2lPeck v. Ward, 18 Pa. 506. The wife's declarations were made
in the presence of the husband, and he made no reply. But the wife's
ownership in common with Mrs. Peck was indisputable and a decla-

rations could not divest this ownership; nor could the wife's deed.
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had been paid, in part to herself, in part to her husband.
Certain declarations of the plaintiff's husband, with respect to the expenses of her education at Philadelphia before her marriage, were offered by the defendant and improperly received. "Nothing that he could say," observes
Tilghman, C. J., "would be evidence against his wife. Her
claim is not through him, but in her own right, and alto22
gether independent of him."
Assumpsit on Life Policy
A policy of life insurance, payable to his wife and children was taken out by Hermany in 1887. After his death,
the beneficiaries sued the company.
A defence was that
the deceased in applying for the policy had made sthtements concerning his health which were false. The defendant offered an application for a pension, made in 1888,
The trial court properly rejected it, saying that "subsequent
declarations cannot be received to affect the beneficiaries
' '2
in the policy. '
Actions For Personal Injuries
A married woman suffered an injury, due, in part, to
the negligence of a township, in not properly constructing
a road, and placing guard rails on its margin. In an action by her husband and her against the township, the husband was called, as for examination, by the defendant, who
likewise offered to prove declarations by him, which tended
to show that the accident was not due to the state of the
road. The action was the wife's, to enforce her right, not
that of the husband. He was joined as plaintiff, in his
capacity as husband, "to conform to the rules of pleading."
He was a "formal and not a real party." His testimony for
the defendant would have been testimony against his wife.
It was therefore incompetant. His declarations also, could
not be given against his wife. They did not appear to have
24
been made in the wife's presence.
11 S. & R. 325.
v. Life Association, 151 Pa. 17.
2 Burr.ell Township v. Uncapher, 117 Pa. 353.
22Smith v. Scudder,
23
Hermany
4
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MOOT COURT
BLAKE'S ESTATE
Husband and Wife-Separation Agreements -

Desertion

-

Divorce

STATEMENT OF FACTS
William Blake and Henrietta, his wife, after being married for
seven years, agreed to separate, he binding himself to pay her eight
dollars per week and she relinquishing all interest in his estate,
which was worth $25,000.00. They separated. Two years later,
William Blake began proceedings for divorce, on the ground of deA
sertion, and his wife did not resist, though duly subpoenaed.
divorce was granted, and William ceased to pay his former wife
the eight dollars weekly. A year later he died. This is a claim in
the Orphans' Court for the arrears of the weekly allowance.
Todd, for the plaintiff.
York, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SHEEDY, J. This is an action for support and maintenance
brought by the wife, Henrietta, against her husband, and is based
on the separation agreement.
The facts here show that William Blake, the husband, by reason of his moral and legal obligations, in his agreeement with his
wife, Henrietta, to separate, bound himself to pay her eight dollars per week as a sufficient allowance for her comfort.
The first question suggested, whether an agreement between
husband and wife to separate is valid, we think is determined by
Comm. v., Richards, 131 Penna. 209; Hutton v. Hutton's Adm., 3 Pa.
100, and other authorities in which it was substantially held that an
agreement between husband and wife for an actual and immediate
separation, if upon reasonable terms and actually carried into effect by both parties in good faith, will be as valid and binding upon
the wife as upon the husband, though made without the intervention of a trustee. The only objection to such contracts is the encouragement which may be afforded for married parties to separate from each other. We think that that amounts to little or
nothing under our liberal divorce system of the present day.
The second question which presents itself is conclusively answered in Carpenter v. Osborn, 102 N. Y. 552, and in many other

250

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

cases in which it is stated that "a subsequent divorce does not
avoid a contract between husband and wife for separation."
And a divorce does not exempt either party from liability on
a prior agreement for separation. Blake v. Cooper, 7 S. & R. 500;
Calame v. Calame, 25 N. J. E. 548; Bloom v. Bloom, 22 Penna. C. C.
433.
Then, if the divorce did not make the agreement between the husband and wife for separation nugatory, there can be no question
as to the ability of the wife to bring this claim, for, the divorce having been granted, she is no longer subject to any of the restrictions
of coverture and, furthermore, a wife may lawfully enforce a separation contract in her own name for, after the divorce, she is just
as free from the bonds of coverture as before.
By the Act of 1815, "a subpoena shall issue forth and upon the
return of such subpoena, upon due proof that the same has been
served personally on the said party wherever found ................ , the
court shall inquire and decide the case in the presence of the parties or, if either will not attend then, ex parte." It cannot be just.y presumed that because the wife did not resist the divorce proceedings after she had been duly subpoenaed, the separation was caused
by misconduct on the part of the wife for there is no evidence to
that effect.
Therefore, since it has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt
that the agreement of separation, containing all the essentials of a
contract, is valid and binding and that it is not affected by any
subsequent divorce and that the relation of husband and wife no
longer exists, the claimant may herself prosecute the claim, and
judgment is accordingly rendered for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
It is well settled that an agreement made "directly between
husband and wife without the intervention of a trustee" "for a separation and for allowance for her support," with a view to immediate separation, are valid and that the wife's rights thereunder may
be enforced in her own name. 9 Cyc. 520; Rodenbaugh v. Rodenbaugh, 17 Super. 619; See note 12 L. R. A. N. S. 850.
It is also held that an agreement between the parties for the
separate support of the wife is not terminated by a decree for
absolute divorce. 14 Cyc. 728; Blaker v. Cooper, 7 S. & R. 500; McGrath v. Pennsylvania Co., 8 Phila. 113; Muir's Est., 59 Super. 393.
See also 6 L. R. A. 487, 9 L. R. A. 113. In Muir's Estate the court
said, "It may seem unjust to require him (the husband) to pay to
her support after the marriage tie has been broken, but the agreement of separation was not for the preservation of the marriage
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relation but its very purpose was the getting rid of certain incidents of matrimony."
The counsel for the estate has contended that the rule just
stated is applicable only in those cases where the divorce was granted because of the misconduct of the husband and that therefore
the rule has no application to this case where the divorce was
granted because of the misconduct of the wife. In support of this
contention he relies upon a rather vague dictum by Justice Tilghman '
in Blaker v. Cooper, supra. In answer to this contention it is sufficient to say that it was distinctly and specifically repudiated in
Muir's Est.
Furthermore the divorce in this case was improperly granted.
An agreement for separation which has not been revoked, and under
which the parties are living apart precludes either from obtaining
a divorce because of desertion.
Mondeau v. Mondeau, 30 Pittsbg.
Leg. J. 364; Alleman v. Alleman, 2 Dauphin Co. 209; 14 Cyc. 634.
Possibly, however, the validity of the divorce cannot be questioned in
this proceeding.
The learned court below committed no error, tho he seems to
have overlooked the fact that William Blake is dead.
Exceptions
dismissed.

ESTATE OF SURATT
Guardian and Ward-Trust Funds-Insolvency of Depositary-Liability of Guardian
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Adven, guardian of Surratt, a youth of sixteen years, deposited
one thousand dollars of the ward's money in the First National Bank,
in his name as guardian. He intended to let the money lie in bank
until he found an inv'estment. The bank agreed to allow him three
per cent interest on the money until he withdrew it, and allowed him
to withdraw it at any time. Three weeks after the deposit was made,
the bank failed, and only six hundred dollars of the deposit was received from it. In the settlement of the guardian's account, the
ward insists that he must make good the whole amount. The bank
was in good repute when the deposit was made. The guardian was
diligent in seeking an investment after making the deposit.
J.L. Baxter, for plaintiff.
H. A. Clark, for defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
GORSON, J. Although the act of March 29, 1832, prescribes inwhat securities a trustee should invest the funds of the cestui que
trust, it does not concern itself with a deposit of money, conditional
upon the finding of a profitable investment. Our law in this respect
is not upon a statutory basis.
"The money was deposited in his name as guardian." Does the
fact that the statement of the case fails to add the name of the ward
to that of the official title of Adven, affect his defense? We think
not. In Law's Estate, 144 Pa. 500, the statement of the case is that,
"money was deposited in the bank in accountant's name as guardian,"
(this is followed by an explanatory note which explains that it
did not appear whether the ward's name was shown on the bank account or not). Clark's Estate, 39 Sup. 446, states, "he opened an account as David Morrison, guardian, in the Enterprise Bank. Evans'
Estate, 7 Sup. 144, holds "The guardian deposited the money in his
name as guardian in a reputable and solvent bank" (an identical
statement of facts with the case at bar). We think it an immaterial
omission to leave out the name of the ward. The fact that it was
deposited in his name, followed by the word "guardian" is sufficient.
The cases quoted contain practically similar statements, and will be
cited infra as determining the point in issue.
It is admitted, that where the trustee deposits trust funds in his
own name, he is personally liable for any loss resulting, without regard to the prudence, good faith or judgment with which he may
have acted. It is also well settled that where the deposits are to
be considered as investments the trustee is always liable. 8 Dickinson Law Review, 187; Trickett, Pa. Law of Guardians 202; Comm.
v. McAllister, 28 Pa. 480; Bear's Appeal, 127 Pa. 360, 4 L. R. A. 609.
The question which now arises is whether the deposit was an
investment.
This is to be determined by the stability of the bank,
whether the guardian was a reasonably prudent man, the duration of
time of the deposit and the diligence of the depositor. Applying the
statement of facts the answer is self-evident, and the bank can only
be considered as a depositary, pending the finding of a safe investment.
Dr. Trickett, (Pa. Law of Guardians, page 201) holds that when
a guardian has acted bona fide and with proper care, he may safely
deposit the trust moneys in a bank, when he retains the power to
withdraw it by check at any time or after a reasonably short notice.
It is generally held that, with reference to funds coming into
their hands, executors and administrators are bound to the observance of fidelity and such diligence as men of ordinary intelligence
observe in managing affairs of their own. 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 617.
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If the guardian, therefore, deposits funds of the estate to the
credit of the estate in a reputable bank, selected by him with that
degree of care which the law exacts, he is ordinarily not liable for
any loss which may occur through the failure of the bank.
A trustee is not liable for loss of money deposited by him as
trustee in a bank of good standing, and the fact that it is agreed
that two weeks notice shall be given before withdrawal, and interest
allowed, does not make the trustee liable, it appearing that the transaction was treated merely as a deposit and was only a temporar7
arrangement. 22 P. and L. D. D. 38662 (Pa.)
A fortiori, the trustee is not liable when the deposit is subject
to check.
"While waiting for the time to pay over the money to creditors
or distributees or to make investment of it, an executor or administrator may deposit it in his official capacity in a bank of good
standing, without liability for loss if the bank fails" is the law as
laid down by Croswell in his work on executors and administrators,
page 271.
Common skill, common prudence and common caution are all
that is required. Brenneman v. Mylin, 12 Pa. C. C. 324.
Darlington's Estate, 245 Pa. 212, the most recent case on the
subject holds that a trustee is not an insurer of the trust funds
against the possibility of loss, and all that is required is good faith
and reasonable diligence. Accord, Adams' Estate, 221 Pa. 77.
Let us see if the case at bar comes within the rule set dovn
above. "The bank was in good repute when the deposit was made.
The guardian was diligent in seeking an investment." From the
facts it appears that Adven took all the precautionary steps necessary to secure his ward's money. He has observed the fidelity and
diligence required of a man of ordinary intelligence.
Now to consider the Pennsylvania cases. Estate of Law, 144 Pa.
499, 14 L. R. A. 103, is the leading case in America, and is direstly
in point. Scott, the guardian of Law, deposited $3000 in the Bank
of America on the advice of his surety that it was entirely solvent
and safe. The deposit was in a separate account in the name of the
guardian as such. The accountant was in search of an investment
and the deposit was only to remain until he could find one. The
bank agreed to allow him 3% interest, but he was to give 2 weeks
notice before withdrawing it. The bank failed three months lateAt the time of the deposit the bank was in good repute and there is
no allegation of bad faith, or want of due care or diligence.
The court held that where the fund is treated by the bank as a
deposit and so entered on its books, it is merely a deposit and not a
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loan to the bank, and it is not at the trustee's risk if he has used due
care in selecting the bank.
Seymour's Estate, 18 Phila. 663, stands for the proposition that an
executor, who temporarily deposits funds of the estate in a bank
of good standing, for safe keeping until a decree of distribution is
made, is not chargeable with a loss resulting from the bank's failure.
Even though the fund is deposited with an individual, the trustee
is not liable if the individual becomes bankrupt. Dorchester v.
Effingham, 31 Rev. Rep. 97.
Robinson's Appeal, 2 Walk. (Pa.) 544, which is an analogons
case to the one under consideration, holds the law in Pennsylvania .o
be identical with that reached in Law's Estate (supra.)
In 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1 and note, the entire subject is exhaustively treated, with special attention given to Pennsylvania decisions.
The conclusion reached there is in accord with that expressed in this
opinion.
In view of the universal tendency of the modern courts to exonerate the guardian, when he has been observant of the duties imposed
upon him by the fiduciary relationship, we feel justified, in directing
a verdict in favor of the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
A guardian or other trustee, making a deposit of trust moneys,
if he wishes to escape liability for the loss of them through the bank's
insolvency, must deposit them not in his own name but in that of
guardian, etc.
Must he also specify the person for whom, or the estate of which,
he is guardian, or trustee? If he were guardian of two or more
persons, and the bank failed, a controversy might arise concerning
whose money was thus lost. A separate account for each ward
would avert dispute.
But if the depositor is guardian of but one
person, a fact easily ascertainable, no difficulty of the sort suggested could arise.
It does not appear that Adven was the guardian of any one else than Surratt. In Law's Estate, 144 Pa. 499,
the deposit was made in the depositor's name as guardian. It did not
appear that the ward's name was mentioned in the bank account.
The guardian was nevertheless held not liable for the loss on the failure of the bank. A different view is taken in O'Conner v. Decker, 95
Wis. 202 (70 N. W. 286). The guardian had deposited money in his
name, with the letters "guar" following. The money being lost, he
was held liable, the court saying, (1) "guar" is not a recognized abbreviation of the word "guardian;" (2) even if it were, "it would
come short of showing that the deposit was made in his office as
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guardian of the plaintiff." Had it appeared that Adven was guardian of others than Surratt, we should hold that his omission to specify the ward, in his bank account, would make him responsible for
any loss.
The guardian had a right to put the money in a bank for safe
keeping, until he could find a suitable investment. The money lay
in the bank but three weeks, before its failure. The guardian had
reserved the right to withdraw the money at any time. In Law's
Estate, supra, the guardian had obliged himself to give two week's
notice of his intention to withdraw the deposit. The bank was in
good repute when the deposit was made.
We think the learned
court below properly disposed of the question whether the guardian
vas liable. Its opinion ably sustains the decree.
Appeal dismissed.

COAL CO. v. SMULL'S HEIRS
Real Property-Condition Subsequent - Breach-Ejectment-Laches
Statute of Limitations
Gorson, for the plaintiff.
Luria, for the defendant.
RORER, J. It is the general experience of mankind that claims
which are valid are not usually allowed to remain neglected, and that
the lapse of years without any attempt to enforce a demand creates
a presumption against its original validity, or that it has ceased to
exist, the negligence or laches of the plaintiff being also advanced as
an additional ground by some of the authorities. The basic principle of this theory and the object of it is to suppress fraudulent and
stale claims from springing up at great distances of time and surprising the parties, or the representatives, when the evidences are
lost, and facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or defective memory, or death, or removal of witnesses.
With these thoughts in view, to properly decide the case at bar we
must take into consideration all the peculiar circumstances involved,
unusual as they are. The question that is presented for our determination is a nice one.
In January 1892, one Smull bought a lot of ground from the
plaintiff Coal Co. and immediately built a three story frame building
and outbuildings thereon. He secured a license to sell liquor on the
premises in the -following March and continued to secure license
and sell liquor until his death in March 1904. In January 1914, the
hotel burned down, and his (Smull's) heirs immediately built another
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hotel (two story) on his premises, and have secured a license and
The habendum
sold liquor up until this action, January 1916.
clause of the deed to Smull provided that if any liquor, malt, vinous
or otherwise, was kept on the premises for sale or were sold thereon,
that said property should revert to the grantors. Liquor has been
sold on the premises continually from 1892 to date.
This is an action of ejectment for the land.
Can the Coal Co. maintain ejectment for the land? It is undisputed that such a condition as provided in the habendum clause of
Smull's deed, in the case at bar, under ordinary circumstances would
be valid and effectual. The cases cited by the defendant's counsel
ably support this proposition. Cowell v. Colorado Springs Co., 100
U. S. 55; Plumb v. Tubbs, 41 N. Y. 442; McKissick v. Pickle, 16 Pa.
140.
Has the plaintiff any claim to the property by virtue of the
breach of this condition? There was a breach of the condition by
reason of this continued sales of intoxicants upon the premises. This
breach occurred in March 1892, but three months after the original
grant of the land. Such sales were continued uninterruptedly and
notoriously for some twenty-three years.
The defendant's license
was renewed yearly and without objection by the plaintiff until the
present action in 1916.
Smull sold liquor on the premises until the day of his death in
1904-a period of twelve years. All during this time the Coal Co.
remained dormant. Upon Smull's death, his heirs entered and used
the premises for the same purpose until the premises were destroyed
by a fire in 1914. We sustain the contention of the defendant that
the heir is entitled to tack his ancestor's possession as his own, thus
tacking the adverse use of the defendant to that of the decedent.
Overfield v. Christie, 7 S. and R. 173; Hart v. Williams, 189 Pa. 31;
Tiffany, Real Property, p. 1001.
Nothing was done by the Coal Co. during Smull's occupation of
the land. He had incurred great expense in improvements and in
erection of new buildings (see 11 Gray 367) and yet the plaintiff
Coal Co. remained silent. We cannot sustain the contentions of the
plaintiff that no improvements were made or money expended on the
property because of the failure of the plaintiff to sue. Nor does the
fact that the defendants built a two story building after the first one
was destroyed by fire raise a presumption that the two story building
was not so valuable as the first one. Nor does it necessarily follow
that the old building was insured for a greater value than the new
one, and therefore the defendant was really withdrawing a part of
his investment in the land. Such assumptions as these are unjustifiable from the statement of the facts.
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After the fire of 1914 the hotel was rebuilt without a scintilla of
objection on the part of the plaintiff, and liquor has been sold on the
Is the plaintiff
premises continuously until the date of this suit.
barred by the Statute of Limitations? The statute of limitations in
an action of ejectment is twenty-one years, and here, the plaintiff
attempts to come into this court and maintain ejectment for the
land after a silence of twenty-four years. Neely's Appeal, 85 Pa.
387; Bickel's Appeal, 86 Pa. 204; Youse v. McCarthey, 51 Sup. 306;
Hovey v. Bradbury, 112 Cal. 620; Ruckman v. Cory, 129 U. S. 387;
Bisphan Equity, p. 344, 9th Ed.
The Coal Co. by their laches and acquiescence have precluded
themselves from maintaining this action. Vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit. Sharon Iron Co. v. City of Erie, 41 Pa. 351.
We cannot understand how this corporation permitted a right
to remain unlitigated for so long a period of time. Corporations as
a rule are alive to their rights and leave nothing undone in support
of them, employing eminent counsel acting somewhat as watch-dogs
for their clients.
But in spite of all these suppositions and of the peculiar and unusual circumstances of the case at bar, we render judgment for, the
defendant, inasmuch as the plaintiff knowingly and without reasonable excuse is guilty of gross laches, and is barred by the Statute
of Limitations, having neglected or omitted to assert its rights.
Judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
A condition in a deed, similar to that under consideration in this
case, was held valid by the Court of Appeals of New York in
Plumb v. Tubbs, 41 N. Y. 442. The same conclusion has been reached
Sioux City v.
by the Supreme Courts of Kansas and Minnesota.
S. R. R. R. Co., 15 L. R. A. 751. Such a condition, says the Supreme
Court of the United States is "not unlawful nor against public policy, but, on the contrary, imposed in the interest of public health and
morality." This doctrine, it has been said, "is so well settled by the
authorities, that it can be regarded as settled law." 15 L. R. A. 751.
Speaking of a similar condition the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has said, "The plaintiff had a right to the strict enforcement of
the condition." Lehigh, etc. Co. v. Early, 162 Pa. 340. "The right of
entry might have been enforced upon breach of the condition in the
deed."
There is, however, a maxim to the effect that conditions which
defeat an estate are odious, and it has been judicially declared that
"no court, either of law or equity, will declare an estate forfeited,
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unless compelled to do so by rigid and unbinding rules."
etc. Co. v. Fridenberg, 175 Pa. 510.

Fidelity,

We do not think that in the present case we are compelled by
"rigid and unbinding rules" to declare the estate of the defendant
forfeited. It is well settled that the conduct of one having the right
to insist on the forfeiture "may have been such as to make it inequitable to insist on his legal rights" and under such circumstances he will not be permitted to do so. 69 L. R. A. 851.
This is, we think, a case in which this principle should be applied. As said by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, "The condition
being a condition subsequent, if the breach was acquiesced in by the
grantor and valuable improvements made, a forfeiture of the estate
should not, after long delay, be permitted." Lehigh etc. Co. v. Early,
162 Pa. 340.
It is true, that in the present case it has not been specifically
proved that the plaintiff was aware of the breach of the condition
by the defendant, but the defendant's conduct in violation of the
condition was so long continued, and the circumstances incident to
it were of such a spectacular and notorious character that we think
that the burden was upon the plaintiff to establish the fact that
it was ignorant of the defendant's misconduct. A presumption that
the plaintiff knew of the defendant's violation is justified by the
general experience of mankind.
Judgment affirmed.

SHINK v. LIFE INSURANCE CO.
Insurance-Warranty - Misrepresentation - Fraud and Concealment
Incontestability Clause-Act of June 23, 1885, P. L. 134
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Win. Shink obtained from the defendants a policy on his life for
ten thousand dollars. Therein he stipulated that he had never been
treated for tuberculosis, pneumonia, or any serious lung disease. The
Company agreed that the policy should be incontestable after a second annual premium had been paid, except for non-payment of
premiums. Wm.Shink died three years after of tuberculosis. His
administrator sues to compel payment of the $10,000.
McWhinney, for the plaintiff.
Pennell, for the defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
HOLDERBAUM, J. The Act of June 23, 1885, P. L. 134, requires that, "Hereafter, whenever a policy of life insurance contains
a clause of warranty of the truth of the answers therein contained,
no misrepresentation or untrue statement in such application, made
in good faith by the applicant, shall effect a forfeiture or be a ground
of defense in any suit brought upon any policy of insurance issued
upon the faith of such application, unless such misrepresentation or
untrue statement relate to matters material to the risk."
This act did not change the law where the matter stated and warranted to be true is material to the risk,.and in such case the question of good faith has no bearing. In the case before the court, the
stipulation of the applicant to the effect that he had never been
treated for tuberculosis, pneumonia, or any serious lung disease is
undoubtedly a statement of fact material to the risk, and therefore, in
accordance with the Act of 1885, and the preexisting law, the question
of deliberate misrepresentation and fraud is immaterial and need
not be considered.
As shown by the authorities relied upon by the defendant, the
rule is well established in Pennsylvania that if the facts warranted
by the insured are false and material to the risk, he cannot recover,
regardless of whether in making the warranty he acted in bad faith
or whether he believed the facts warranted to be true or was careless of whether or not they were true. Marsh v. Life Ins. Co., 186
Pa. 629; Archer v. Life Ins. Co., 13 Phila. 139; Fire Ins. Co. v. McAnerney, 102 Pa. 335; Fire Ins. Co. v. Huntzinger, 98 Pa. 41; Aid Society v. White, 100 Pa. 12 But in every case cited by the defendant
there was sufficient evidence to prove a mis-statement of fact.
In the case at bar, the fact that the applicant died of tuberculosis three years after he obtained the policy is not even presumptive
evidence that there was a concealment of facts, for there are many
cases of "acute inflamatory tuberculosis," commonly called "galloping consumption," in which only a few weeks intervene between the
inception of the disease and the death of the afflicted. And even if
it were presumptive evidence of concealment the defendant company
has waived its right to use that as a defense by its negligence in issuing a policy when the questions and answers did not disclose satisfactory information pertinent to the material facts. The question
"Have you ever been treated for tuberculosis?" does not include interrogation as to whether the applicant had any reasons to believe that
he had or would have tuberculosis or had inherited a tendency toward
the disease.
If the applicant has answered the questions asked in the application he is justified in assuming that no further information is
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desired. 25 Cyc. 797. In Rawls v. Life Ins. Co., 27 N. Y. 282, it was
held that "if the applicant answers frankly and truly all the questions
put to him, then there is no concealment. The mere omission to
state matter not called for by any specific or general question would
not be a concealment and would not affect the validity of the policy.
It may be conceded that if the applicant, when a specific or even
general question is put to him which would elicit a fact material to
the risk, untruly stated or concealed the fact it would vitiate the policy, but insurers have never been discharged from their contracts
because the applicant did not go farther and state what was not
called for by interrogatories."
When an answer to a question is ambiguous and indefinite on its
face, the insurer should require a more specific answer before he
issues the policy. If he fails to do so and issues the policy he cannot subsequently set up, in an action against him, an alleged breach
of warranty arising from one constructio of ambiguous language."
Insurance Co. v. Kepler, 106 Pa. 28. In Ins. Co. v. Paul, 91 Pa. 520,
where the company issues a policy in spite of the fact that a question which was material to the risk, was left unanswered, the court
held that the company waived all claim to further answers. Courts
of law do not favor forfeitures; and so, in all doubtful matters, the
presumption is most strongly against the insurer. Therefore it must
be concluded that there was no concealment of a material fact in
Shink's stipulation.
But the decision does not turn upon that question. The real
question is whether false statements warranted to be true even though
made fraudulently may be set up as a defense by a company that
has issued a policy agreeing that the policy should be incontestable
except for non-payment of premiums, after a second annual premium had been paid.
The great weight of authority favors the rule that an incontestability clause is valid and after the payment of premiums the insurer
is precluded from setting up any defense based upon misrepresentations or warranties made by the insured in his application, whether
fraudulent or not. The test as to what defense the insurer is precluded from offering by the incontestability clause seems to be one
of public policy and in Brady v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 5 Kulp,
505, it was held that such a clause did not close the door to the defense of the lack in the beneficiary of an insurable interest which is
necessary to take the policy out of the wager class. The validity of
the incontestability clause as against inquiries into representations
and warranties of the insured after the stipulated period bears this
test of public policy. In Regan v. Life Ins. Co., 76 N. E. 217, it was
held, "It is not against public policy as tending to put fraud on a par
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with honesty. The issuance of the policy may be considered as not
induced by reliance upon fraudulent representations but by an investigation which the defendant conducted upon which he relied. The
opinion in Wright v. Mut. Benefit Life Ass'n., 118 N. Y. 237, considers that "it is not a stipujation absolute to waive all defenses and
condone fraud. On the contrary it recognizes fraud and all other
defenses, but it provides ample time and opportunity within which
they may be but beyond which they may not be established. It is
in the nature of a statute of limitation, and is exemplified in the
statute's giving a certain period after the discovery of a fraud in
which to apply for redress on account of it, and in the law requiring
prompt application after its discovery if one would be relieved from
a contract infected with fraud." In accord with these decisions are
Murray v. Life Assurance Co., 53 L. R. A. 742; Patterson v. Life
Ins. Co., 42 L. R. A. 253. Clement v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 58 N. Y. 570.
Two Pennsylvania decisions made in 1902, viz. Brady v. Prudential Ins. Co., 168 Pa. 654, and Doll v. Prudential Ins. Co., 21 Super.
434, uphold these decisions. In the latter case although the incontestability clause was held not to preclude an inquiry as to the question of fact concerning the age of the insured at the date of the policy in order to fix the amount of recovery according to a provision
in the third clause to this effect: "Sum insured on the above terms
and subject to correction for misstatement of age, $110.00," it was
further held that "if the misstatement of age were set up as a breach
of warranty or as violating the contract whereby the company would
be relieved from all contracted obligations the question would be
different."
"The purpose of the incontestability clause is not to preclude inquiry into the truthfulness or good faith of the statements made in
the application, but to fix a time within which such inquiry shall be
made. This is a matter concerning which parties may contract, and
such contracts are upheld as reasonable and proper and not against
public policy. No doubt the defendant held it out as an inducement
to insurance by removing the hesitation in the minds of prudent men
against paying ill afforded premiums for a series of years, and in
the end and after payment of premiums, the death of the insured and
the loss of his testimony and that of others, the claimant instead of
receiving the promised insurance, is met by an expensive law-suit
to determine that the insurance which the deceased has been paying
for through many years, has not and never had an existence except
in name. While fraud is obnoxious and should justly vitiate all
contracts, the courts should exercise care that fraud and imposition
should not be successful in annulling an agreement to the effect that
if cause be not found and charged within a reasonable and specific
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time establishing the invalidity of the contract of insurance, it should
thereafter be treated as valid." This quotation from Central Trust
Co. v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co., 45 Pa. Superior 313, furnishes
conclusive authority for our decision that the incontestability clause
precludes, after the specified period, any investigation of the statements of the applicant in regard to his" health, and that judgment
must be for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The only stipulation which could have been broken, is that the
insured had never been treated for tuberculosis, pneumonia, or any
other serious lung disease. It is not shown that this stipulation was
untrue. To have died three years after the issue of the policy, is not
to have been treated for tuberculosis, before the issue of it. The
policy does not exclude death from tuberculosis from the forms of
death for which the money should become payable upon it.
Let us suppose however, that the evidence showed that Wm.
Shink had been treated for tuberculosis before he procured the policy.
The policy would then have been voidable. The company could have
cancelled it; could have required its surrender by a bill in equity.
Had Shink died before the payment of the second annual premium,
the company could have successfully defended an action upon it. He
did not die until three years after the issue of the policy. If its
agreement was valid, that after the payment of the second premium,
the policy should be contestable only for non-payment of premiums,
it is now too late to allege that any of the warranties were untrue.
The learned court below has properly held that this agreement is valid.
Central Trust Co. v. Life Ins. Co., 45 Super. 313; Lawler v. Ins. Cn
of America, 59 Super. 409. That a limitation of the time within which
the policy may be contested, is sound, is assumed in Brady v. Prudential Ins. Co., 168 Pa. 645.
The learned court below has well fortified its decision, and a
The judgment is
prolonged discussion by us is quite unnecessary.
therefore affirmed.

